



WHAT’S YOUR PRIVACY WORTH ON THE 
GLOBAL TECH MARKET? 
WEIGHING THE COST OF PROTECTING 
CONSUMER DATA AGAINST THE RISK THAT 
NEW LEGISLATION MAY STIFLE COMPETITION 




The world is currently in an artificial intelligence (“AI”) arms race, 
whereby the first nation to develop AI will become the global super nation. 
That country will set the precedent for generations of future economic, 
technological, medical, and societal growth. While companies like 
Facebook, Google, and Amazon have propelled the United States to the 
front of this race for AI dominance, corporations have over-stepped ethical 
norms of data gathering and processing: methods necessary for 
technological development. Numerous data privacy breaches have left 
some consumers unlikely to ever share their data willingly without some 
assurances of protection. Noting these corporate scandals and data’s 
potential for abuse, many countries have implemented data privacy laws 
to protect consumers. Statutes enacted for this purpose include the 
European Union’s ratification of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”), the United States’ various local statutes, and China’s 
cybersecurity law (“CSL”) and its Personal Information Security 
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Specification (“2018 Specification”). This Note argues that enacting 
wide-spread legislation as a means of protecting consumer data will cause 
more problems than it solves. Over-legislating technology will threaten 
innovation as tight-leashed constraints on development hinder growth. 
The consequences to a nation’s global stance in this race to innovate are 
tantamount to individuals’ privacy interests. The real battle will be 
treading the line between protecting citizens’ privacy while facilitating 
technological growth. After examining the flaws with the GDPR, the CSL, 
and the 2018 Specification, this Note urges the United States to enact a 
federally binding data privacy statute, incorporating some principles 
found within various pieces of legislation, that strikes a balance between 
protecting consumer data privacy and enabling technological innovation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO DATA PRIVACY AND REGULATORY 
PROTECTIONS  
Every day, over four billion people use the internet, spending 
over US$2.84 trillion in sales, and conducting over five billion 
Google searches.1 Every click, like, view, post, share, and search 
internet users conduct generates data. Companies collect and 
process this data to help them better understand their clientele, 
provide their users a more tailored experience, and develop their 
technology.2 Data collection benefits businesses who can, through 
gathering methods, grow and adapt their practices based on the 
data-driven insights they obtain.3 From those insights, companies 
learn how best to market their products by analyzing consumer 
behavior and targeting product services toward specific groups.4 
While this is an undeniably helpful asset for corporations and 
 
1. See Grace Park, Note, The Changing Wind of Data Privacy Law: A Comparative Study 
of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and the 2018 California Consumer 
Privacy Act, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1455, 1459 (2020) (citing Internet Stats & Facts (2021), 
WEBSITE SETUP, https://websitesetup.org/news/internet-facts-stats/ 
[https://perma.cc/N3YB-Q6M5] (last visited Feb. 15, 2021)). 
2. See Why Data is Important for Your Business, GROW (Mar. 9, 2020), 
https://www.grow.com/blog/data-important-business [https://perma.cc/T7QQ-
3BDT]. 
3. See id. 
4. See DELOITTE, THE ANALYTICS ADVANTAGE WE’RE JUST GETTING STARTED 6 
(2013). 
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consumers searching for certain products,5 individuals fear data-
gathering practices intrude upon their privacy rights.6 Further, 
through analyzing customer behavior and utilizing targeted ads, 
data-gathering algorithms either purposely or inadvertently place 
consumers in echo chambers, fueling misinformation and 
dangerous self-serving beliefs.7 
Though the echo chamber-producing results are less than 
ideal, technology—especially artificial intelligence (“AI”)—is 
essential to societal advancement. As a result, countries 
throughout the world are currently in an artificial intelligence 
arms race, whereby the nation that develops AI superintelligence 
first will likely become the global super nation.8 That country will 
be responsible for driving future economic, technological, 
medical, and societal growth.9 The type of AI referred to here and 
through this Note is artificial general intelligence (“AGI”). 
Existing AI finds patterns and makes predictions based on those 
patterns.10 AGI, in contrast, refers to human-like reasoning which 
includes the ability to make causal predictions.11 While pattern 
and causal predictions may sound the same, causal predictions 
involve counter-factual reasoning about multiple hypothetical 
 
5. See discussion infra Section II.A (discussing the Author’s experience searching 
for a product for hours before an Instagram advertisement showed her exactly what she 
was searching for and where to find it). 
6. See Shiva Maniam, Americans Feel the Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-between-privacy-and-security-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/AE6T-53AW] (“Our surveys show that people now are more anxious 
about the security of their personal data and are more aware that greater and greater 
volumes of data are being collected about them. The vast majority feel they have lost 
control of their personal data, and this has spawned considerable anxiety. They are not 
very confident that companies collecting their information will keep it secure.”). 
7. See discussion infra Section II.A (explaining what targeted advertising is, how it 
works, and how it places consumers in echo chambers). 
8. See Indermit Gill, Whoever Leads in Artificial Intelligence in 2030 Will Rule the world 
World Until 2100, BROOKINGS (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-
development/2020/01/17/whoever-leads-in-artificial-intelligence-in-2030-will-rule-the-
world-until-2100/ [https://perma.cc/6BDS-645F]. 
9. See id. 
10. Telephone Interview with Scott Mueller, PhD. Candidate, UCLA (Oct. 10, 
2019); see also Hal Hodson, DeepMind and Google: the Battle to Control Artificial Intelligence, 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/1843/2019/03/01/deepmind-and-google-the-battle-to-
control-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/H758-ZTUQ]. 
11. See id. 
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scenarios that meaningfully differ from observed patterns.12 
Consequently, whichever nation develops this type of AI first will 
likely become the global super nation.13 That country will be 
responsible for driving future economic, technological, medical, 
and societal growth.14 While this boost to notoriety may not 
happen overnight, even inching closer toward AI 
superintelligence can have a remarkable impact on a country’s 
well-being.15  
Still, some countries are currently struggling with the 
dissonance of wanting to promote innovation and advancing 
their nation in the technological arms race while protecting their 
citizens’ data privacy from potentially data-abusing corporations. 
This “protection” will have consequences equally as threatening 
to a nation’s global stance in this race to innovate as exposure 
does to individuals’ privacy interests. The real battle will be 
treading the line between protecting citizens’ privacy and 
facilitating technological growth. 
In this race for AI dominance, many companies have over-
stepped ethical norms of data gathering and processing, and their 
actions threaten consumer privacy and data security. These data 
breaches, including the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal,16 
have left some consumers unlikely to ever share their data 
willingly without some assurances of protection.17 Noting these 
corporate scandals and their potential for user data privacy abuse, 
many countries have implemented data privacy laws to protect 
consumers. Statutes enacted for this purpose include the 
European Union’s ratification of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”)18, the United States’ various local statutes,19 
 
12. See id. 
13. See Gill, supra note 8. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. See Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal analysis, infra Section II.A.5. 
17. Data privacy scandals are examined in more detail infra Section II.A. 
18. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
19. See discussion infra Section III.B (referencing examination of various pieces of 
US legislation, including analysis of the California Consumer Privacy Act, the Data 
Privacy Act, and the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act). 
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and China’s cybersecurity law (“CSL”)20 and its Personal 
Information Security Specification (“2018 Specification”).21 
Racing to legislate privacy protections may seem logical in the 
wake of serious abuses of data privacy, but this Note argues that 
over-legislation threatens technological innovation as tight-
leashed constraints on development hinder growth. Among 
countries without privacy protections, one nation stands out: 
China.  
China is a notorious surveillance state, monitoring its 
citizens’ every move as a means of providing governmental 
protection as well as gathering information.22 Chinese laws have 
historically offered citizens significantly fewer privacy protections 
than those of other nations.23 The country’s new CSL and 2018 
Specification, however, seem to offer stronger security against 
data threats than US policies. These laws center around consumer 
rights; providing customers with protections against harmful 
private business practices.24 These laws, however, do not restrict 
the Chinese government’s access to private data.25 Further, these 
new laws seem to offer Chinese citizens the privacy rights desired 
by American consumers.26 A more thorough examination of the 
 
20. See Rogier Creemers et al., Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Effective June 1, 2017), NEW AM. (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-
cybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/ [https://perma.cc/5ZC7-YUQG]. 
21. See Mingli Shi et al., Translation: China’s Personal Information Security Specification, 
NEW AM. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-
initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinas-personal-information-security-
specification/ [https://perma.cc/XZ2C-CZ6F]. 
22. See Anna Mitchell & Larry Diamond, China’s Surveillance State Should Scare 
Everyone, ATL. (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/china-
surveillance/552203/ [https://perma.cc/N7PX-GRQA]. 
23. See Xiaofeng Lin, Note, A Dangerous Game: China’s Big Data Advantage and How 
the U.S. Should Respond, 2020 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 253, 266 (2020) (referencing 
James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability, and Internet Surveillance in the U.S. and China: Better the 
Devil You Know?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 419, 440 (2015)). 
24. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
25. See Bojan Pancevski, U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2020, 8:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-say-
huawei-can-covertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256 [https://perma.cc/5F9Y-
3MYW] (referring to China’s laws requiring corporations to disclose private information 
to the government at its request). 
26. See Deep Tech, Podcast: Want Consumer Privacy Rights? Try China, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/19/1007425/data-
privacy-china-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/5GCA-UBNW]. 
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two statutes, however, reveals the acts focus more on national 
security concerns than on individual rights.27 Still, the CSL and 
2018 Specification are more comprehensive than anything the 
United States has enacted, though they are less stringent than the 
GDPR. 
In this sliding scale approach to legislation, the European 
Union sits at one end aggressively protecting consumer privacy 
rights to the detriment of technology-driven businesses.28 China 
sits on the other end with nation-wide privacy protections 
deterring private entities from gathering data without consent 
but allowing the government and military to do so freely. Where 
the United States lies on this privacy spectrum remains to be seen. 
With no federal data privacy statute in effect, the United States 
offers fewer national protections than the world’s most surveilled 
country.29 Considering its dominance in the technology field, the 
world will be watching to see how the United States handles 
increasing demands for data security while maintaining its 
position in the race for technological dominance. 
This Note explores emerging legislation in various 
jurisdictions tackling the issue of unchecked data collection by 
private companies, and whether such legislation harms 
technological growth and innovation. Part II explains what data 
is and defines key terms necessary to understand the impact data 
usage has on society. It explains why data is so valuable while 
examining how sharing consumer data with several organizations 
has come under fire lately. Part III explains the various legislative 
approaches nations have taken to protect data privacy. First, it 
examines the European Union’s adoption of the GDPR and 
analyzes what GDPR compliance entails. Then, it explains the 
various statutes in force in the United States, while noting that the 
country lacks a federally-binding data privacy statute. Next, it 
discusses how the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
several states are unevenly enforcing consumer data-protection in 
 
27. See Samm Sacks, China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect, LAWFARE 
(June 1, 2017, 10:56 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-
what-expect [https://perma.cc/YQ84-4D5Z]. 
28. See discussion infra Section IV.A.  
29. See Matthew Keegan, The Most Surveilled Cities in the World, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14, 
2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-08-14/the-top-10-
most-surveilled-cities-in-the-world. 
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America. Finally, it ends with an evaluation of China’s two most 
distinct regulations regarding data privacy: the CSL and the 2018 
Specification. 
Part IV explores what a US federally-binding data privacy 
statute should include drawing from the successful aspects of the 
GDPR, CCPA, CSL, and 2018 Specifications. In doing so, this Part 
examines the GDPR’s shortcomings and how the law can be 
harmful to technological innovation. Overall, Part IV analyzes the 
impact of each response nations have undertaken in trying to 
combat data-privacy misuse. It argues that while the United States 
needs federal data protection, a GDPR-sized statute may stifle 
competition too much to maintain the United States’ position in 
the tech arms race. Ideally, corporations would have more 
transparent privacy practices, encouraging consumers to feel 
more comfortable with sharing their data. One possible solution 
is introducing legislation that requires corporations to use only 
explainable AI practices.30 These corporations would also have to 
obtain consent from consumers before using their data and to re-
obtain consent upon any changes to the agreed-upon data usage. 
The Note concludes by arguing that the United States can 
reconcile the competing interests of consumers, corporations, 
and the government with a federal privacy statute that contains 
clear and concise compliance obligations. 
II. WHAT DATA IS AND WHY COMPANIES GO TO SUCH 
GREAT LENGTHS TO OBTAIN YOURS 
Data collection is a powerful tool capable of driving 
technological innovation far beyond what man could do without 
AI processors. Through data collection, companies have created 
self-driving cars that accumulate vast amounts of digitized images 
to improve vision recognition software.31 International Business 
Machine’s Watson also uses AI to analyze digital research 
records.32 In only two months, Watson has found six new cancer 
suppressors: a feat that would have taken scientists years to 
 
30. See discussion infra notes 357-360 and accompanying text defining “explainable 
AI.” 
31. See Lynn Wu, How Data Analytics Can Drive Innovation, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, 
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/data-analytics-
innovation/ [https://perma.cc/8XYK-FX8Y]. 
32. See id. 
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achieve.33 In addition to medicine, data has also aided 
advancements in ecology,34 oceanography,35 and scientific 
processes.36 Of the many types of data,37 personal data refers to 
identifiable information like an individual’s name, address, 
phone number, employment location, credit card information, 
social security number, and more.38 The term “data privacy” 
describes the pertinent use of an individual’s information in a 
given situation, in light of the expectations of the law, the 
individual, and the right to control use and disbursement of that 
data.39 Through using an entity’s servers, users who accept its 
privacy policy allow the server to collect their data, thus willingly 
exchanging their data privacy for favorable services. For example, 
users’ disclosure of personal data allows them to activate and use 
the internet and social media accounts.40 By gaining control over 
consumers’ personal data, companies can enter a user’s behavior 
and demographic characteristics into an algorithm that then 
informs the company how best to adapt their services to meet and 
exceed client demands.41 The more data a company has, the more 
it can tailor its services to a particular demographic and improve 
its products.42 This, in turn, attracts more users which generates 
 
33. See id. 
34. See Lin, supra note 23, at 262 (referencing James R. Hunt et al., Redefining 
Ecological Science Using Data, in MICROSOFT, THE FOURTH PARADIGM: DATA-INTENSIVE 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 21, 21 (Tony Hey et al. eds., 2009)). 
35. See Lin, supra note 23, at 262 (recognizing John R. Delaney & Roger S. Barga, A 
2020 Vision for Ocean Science, in MICROSOFT, THE FOURTH PARADIGM: DATA-INTENSIVE 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 27, 27 (Tony Hey et al. eds., 2009)). 
36. See Lin, supra note 23, at 263 (referencing Mark R. Abbott, A New Path for 
Science?, in MICROSOFT, THE FOURTH PARADIGM: DATA-INTENSIVE SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
111, 111 (Tony Hey et al. eds., 2009)). 
37. This Note will only examine personal data. 
38. See generally Park, supra note 1. 
39. See Park, supra note 1, at 1458 (citing What Does Privacy Mean?, 
IAPP, https://iapp.org/about/what-is-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/KQ3M-GGQH] (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2021)); see also Data Privacy vs. Data Protection: Understanding the Distinction 




40. See Park, supra note 1, at 1459. 
41. See Max Freedman, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re Doing 
With It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (June 17, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-
businesses-collecting-data.html [https://perma.cc/C3BZ-HF3H]. 
42. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May 
6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-
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more data and continues the process.43 Data collection is 
incredibly valuable to technology companies because data, as the 
primary input of AI technology, drives the rise and advancement 
of AI.44 In 2016 alone, people produced as much data as had been 
produced in all of history through 2015, proving that there is 
ample data available for processing.45 Accordingly, access to this 
abundant data will be crucial for companies hoping to compete 
in the AI arms race.46 
While data can serve many useful functions, there are 
unwelcomed consequences of data collection. Because online 
data processing relies on such vast amounts of data from countless 
online actors, processors often use consumer data without first 
obtaining the owner’s consent.47 A server can obtain consent in 
one of two ways: (1) the user can willingly disclose their data to a 
company, often by agreeing to a server’s terms of use or privacy 
policies, 48 or (2) through indirect means of disclosure such as 
mining data through use of cookies, web bugs, tracking software, 
or monitoring IP addresses.49 Some find firms’ profiling of users 
to be a privacy rights violation but insist that if individuals want to 
continue using a processor’s services, the individual does not have 
 
resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/UF97-FZ6V]. See also Park, supra 
note 1, at 1460 (citing Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-
Governmental Actors and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 729 (2015)). 
43. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, supra note 42. 
44. See Lin, supra note 23, at 262 (referencing Cade Metz, As China Marches Forward 
on A.I., the White House Is Silent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/china-trump-artificial-
intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/EX3K-7YBS]). 
45. See id. at 254 (citing Dirk Helbing et al., Will Democracy Survive Big Data and 
Artificial Intelligence?, SCI. AM. (Feb. 25, 2017), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-democracy-survive-big-data-and-
artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/U9TX-XLKE]). 
46. See Clay Chandler, How China’s Rise as AI Superpower Could Reshape the World, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2018, 8:49 AM), http://fortune.com/2018/09/26/china-ai-
superpower-book-review/ [https://perma.cc/U73U-7ZNJ]. 
47. See Lita van Wel & Lambèr Royakkers, Ethical Issues in Web Data Mining, 6 ETHICS 
& INFO. TECH. 129, 129 (2004), https://cdn.tc-
library.org/Rhizr/Files/FkE9DdrKdtH7PAQaw/files/124601.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ZEN-BUSZ]. 
48. Park, supra note 1, at 1459 (citing CLARA RUYAN MARTIN & DAVID B. OSHINSKY, 
INTERNET LAW & PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA § 9.3(1) (2019)). 
49. See Park, supra note 1, at 1460 (citing MARTIN & OSHINSKY, supra note 48, § 
9.4(2)). 
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much choice in allowing the firm to continue mining their data.50 
In theory, consenting to these practices is simple: if a user does 
not want their data mined, they should not use these platforms. 
In reality, opting-out of certain services becomes much more 
complicated. As social media advances society, lack of 
participation may leave individuals feeling left behind. Through 
these websites and applications, people are finding new means of 
connecting with one another that seemed impossible only a 
decade ago.51 From connecting with friends that users have not 
seen in years, to finding long-lost relatives and even locating 
missing pets, the internet can be a force for good. Social media 
“groups,” likes those Facebook allows user to create, have 
encouraged participants to form support groups and have even 
found organ donors for patients in need, not to mention the 
hours of enjoyment users gain from browsing these sites.52 
With all the benefits that social media affords, some users, 
however, have become the unwitting targets of unsolicited 
advertising and data mining. Some companies’ failure to 
implement sufficient privacy policies protecting personal data not 
only worries users but also enables companies to profit from the 
misuse of user data.53 Lately, data collection has come under 
intense scrutiny from several governments as well as consumers 
due to corporate mishandling of classified information and 
unethical data practices.54 The public, as a result, has begun 
pressuring the government into implementing legislation to 
protect consumer privacy rights.55 
 
50. See Park, supra note 1, at 1473 (citing Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy and the 
First Amendment: An Opt-In Approach to Data Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2014)). 
51. See infra text accompanying note 54. 
52. See THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Exposure Labs 2020), 
https://www.thesocialdilemma.com [https://perma.cc/D5JY-XDQ4]. 
53. See Park, supra note 1, at 1457 (citing Justin McCarthy, Worries About Personal 
Data Top Facebook Users’ Concerns, GALLUP (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/232343/worries-personal-data-top-facebook-
usersconcerns.aspx [https://perma.cc/NE23-FKPU]); see also Brian Byer, Internet Users 
Worry About Online Privacy but Feel Powerless to Do Much About It, ENTREPRENEUR (June 20, 
2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/314524 [https://perma.cc/AME8-
2V6U]. 
54. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
55. Current US data policies are discussed in depth in Part II of this Note. See Park, 
supra note 1, at 1457 (referring to PUBLIC OPINION ON PRIVACY, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY 
INFO. CTR., https://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ [https://perma.cc/ZPS4-WS5L] 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2021)). 
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A. Notorious Corporate Data Breach Scandals 
1. Google is Infested with Data-Mining Bugs 
In October of 2018, Google announced plans to shut down 
Google+—Google’s attempt at providing a social network 
service—after learning of a “bug” whereby external hackers 
exploited Google’s software, exposing 500,000 users’ data during 
a three-year period.56 Months later, Google found another bug in 
a Google+ API57 which exposed 52.5 million users’ data that these 
data owners had not made publicly available, including private 
messages between users.58 David Kennedy, the CEO of TrustedSec 
(an information security advisory service company), stated that 
the Google breach “didn’t impact passwords or financial data, but 
it did give [Google] the ability to extract large amounts of 
information like email addresses and profile data.”59 While 
exposing user data is never good, Kennedy realized this exposure 
is one risk companies continuously take as they race to provide to 
consumers the newest, most advanced technologies on the 
market.60 Further, Kennedy, along with other critics, felt Google’s 
quick detection in the aftermath of the October incident was 
“heartening” as it signified Google’s active monitoring measures 
even in a program it planned on shutting down in mere days.61 In 
his statement, Kennedy referred to the six days it took Google to 
detect and consolidate the November security breach as opposed 
to the three years it took them to announce the previous breach.62 
While Google’s failure to report the initial security breach 
until three years after it began was not illegal, it did leave many 
 
56. See Lily Hay Newman, A New Google+ Blunder Exposed Data From 52.5 Million Users, 
WIRED (Dec. 10, 2018, 2:19 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-plus-bug-52-
million-users-data-exposed/ [https://perma.cc/U9JF-3SKU]. 
57. “APIs are sets of requirements that govern how one application can talk to 
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instance, by cutting and pasting a snippet of a LibreOffice document into an Excel 
spreadsheet.” Brian Proffitt, What APIs Are and Why They’re Important, READWRITE (Sept. 
19, 2013), https://readwrite.com/2013/09/19/api-defined/ 
[https://perma.cc/XE7M-876P]. 
58. See Newman, supra note 56. 
59. Id. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
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wondering why Google did not come forward sooner.63 Critics felt 
the company’s failure to disclose not only threatened the data 
privacy of millions of users, but also cast doubt on Google’s 
allegiance to its consumers, alleging Google did not disclose the 
breach for fear of embarrassing the company.64 Steven Andrés, a 
management information systems professor at San Diego State 
University, acknowledged the lack of a legal requirement to 
disclose the software vulnerabilities, but found it “troubling—
though unsurprising” that the company was more concerned with 
appearances if it chose to report.65 Because Google’s failure to 
disclose the breach was not illegal, and because it reported 
finding no evidence that “any user profiles were touched,”66 some 
find no fault with Google’s silence. Arvind Narayanan, a 
Princeton University computer science professor, is often critical 
of tech companies’ flawed privacy practices.67 Regarding Google, 
however, Narayanan tweeted that companies often fix problems 
before they are exploited and that internally discovering and 
immediately fixing software issues happens “thousands of times 
every year.”68 For that reason, Narayanan feels new laws requiring 
disclosure of every threat would be “totally counterproductive.”69 
2. Capital One: What’s in Your Data? 
While the 2018 Google data privacy violation showed how 
external hackers can threaten data privacy, a 2019 Capital One 
server breach proved internal actors can be just as dangerous. In 
March 2019, Capital One servers suffered a data breach which 
exposed personally-identifying information of millions of the 
bank’s customers.70 The United States Department of Justice 
 
63. See id. 
64. See id. 
65. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Plus Will Be Shut Down After User Information Was 




67. See id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See Rob McLean, A Hacker Gained Access to 100 million Capital One Credit Card 
Applications and Accounts, CNN BUS. (July 30, 2019, 5:17 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/29/business/capital-one-data-breach/index.html 
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reported that the breach gave hacker Paige Thompson access to 
140,000 Social Security numbers, 1 million Canadian Social 
Insurance numbers, and 80,000 bank account numbers.71 
Additionally, Thompson accessed an unknown number of 
customers’ personal information such as names, addresses, credit 
scores, credit limits, balances, and more.72 Capital One stored the 
personal data on external Amazon servers.73 Thompson, a former 
Amazon tech software engineer familiar with the technology, was 
able to hack into Amazon’s servers by exploiting a “misconfigured 
web application firewall.”74 In a statement, Thompson explained 
she used a command to extract files Capital One had stored on 
Amazon servers.75 Capital One claims to have fixed the 
vulnerability and does not feel the information gained was used 
for fraud or shared with third parties.76 While Capital One has 
taken steps to fix the server weaknesses and has worked with 
customers to restore their losses, many feel the hack demonstrates 
the dangers of companies relying on authorized third parties 
when securing sensitive data.77 
3. TikTok’s Data Flops 
While internal hackers can pose an existential threat to 
corporations, sometimes company practices alone threaten users’ 
safety and data. The targeting of children in corporate data 
collection and sharing practices compounds user fears of data 
security breaches.78 On February 27, 2019, TikTok’s79 parent 
 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. Id. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See Hannah Murphy & Shannon Bond, Capital One Data Breach Sparks Cloud 
Security Fears, FIN. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/5b3046ca-b2d4-
11e9-bec9-fdcab53d6959 [https://perma.cc/R4AH-89LP]; but see LILLIAN ABLOM, PAUL 
HEATON, DIANA CATHERINE LAVERY & SASHA ROMANOSKY, CONSUMER ATTITUDES 
TOWARD DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS AND LOSS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (RAND 
Corp. 2016) (noting that the vast majority of data breaches are discovered by third 
parties, rather than the affected company). 
78. See Stephanie Simon, The Big Biz of Spying on Little Kids, POLITICO (May 17, 2014, 
1:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/data-mining-your-children-106676 
[https://perma.cc/CTY8-FG4G]. 
79. TikTok is a social media app that allows users to upload short video clips, usually 
involving songs and popular dance trends. It rapidly grew in popularity, surpassing other 
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company, ByteDance, responded to allegations that TikTok 
illegally collected the data of minors and agreed to pay the FTC a 
US$5.7 million settlement.80 The excessive fines imposed on the 
social media company were not solely a response to the data 
abuses, but to penalize the company for unlawfully targeting 
children.81 Companies’ collection of data or information from 
children under thirteen years old without parental permission 
violates the United States’ Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act of 1998 (“COPPA”).82 The issue with allowing children on 
TikTok, according to one reporter, is that children rarely 
understand the complexities or necessities of privacy.83 FTC Chair 
Joe Simons admitted that the operators of TikTok knew children 
used their app, but continued to collect personal information 
from their accounts without seeking parental consent before 
doing so.84 While TikTok has paid the US$5.7 million FTC fine, 
as of May 2020, children’s advocacy groups continue to criticize 
TikTok for failing to take down child-created content as promised 
under the February 2019 FTC agreement.85 These advocacy 
groups claim the company still unlawfully collects information 
from children’s accounts and shares that data with third parties 
for advertising purposes.86 
TikTok has also faced other serious allegations over data 
security breaches within the app. According to Israeli 
cybersecurity company CheckPoint, the app has “serious 
vulnerabilities” that can afford hackers access and control over 
user data, revealing personal information.87 These weaknesses 
 
popular social media sites such as Snapchat and Twitter in app store downloads by only 
its second birthday. See Chavie Lieber, TikTok has Been Illegally Collecting Children’s Data, 
VOX (Feb. 28, 2019, 2:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-
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[https://perma.cc/M2YC-6YYW]. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6501 (Lexis Advance through Pub. L. No. 116-158). 
83. See Lieber, supra note 79. 
84. See id. 
85. See Advocacy Group Says TikTok Violated FTC Consent Decree and Children’s Privacy 
Rules, REUTERS (May 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1N2CV2LV 
[https://perma.cc/K52B-CYDE]. 
86. See id. 
87. Ronen Bergman, Sheera Frenkel & Raymond Zhong, Major TikTok Security Flaws 
Found, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 08, 2020), 
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would have enabled hackers to reach TikTok users by sending 
messages with malicious links that, once opened, would grant the 
hackers control over the accounts and their content (including 
private videos).88 CheckPoint tested these alleged vulnerabilities 
and found they were able to send themselves malware infested 
links that gave them complete access to others’ accounts.89 
In addition to private sector data privacy concerns, the 
Trump administration has also faced internal data privacy 
concerns.90 Throughout much of 2020, President Trump alleged 
that TikTok posed a threat to national security because of its ties 
to the Chinese government.91 The President feared the app 
gathers data for the Chinese Communist Party to enable them to 
spy on American users.92 TikTok denies allegations of both 
censorship and user data sales, though its privacy policies 
explicitly mention the distribution of user data to third-party 
sites.93 While the Trump Administration’s fears of data-gathering 
as a means of Chinese governmental surveillance may seem far-
fetched, even xenophobic to some,94 Chinese surveillance of 
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4. Huawei’s Tele-miscommunication 
For years, countries like the United States and Germany have 
opposed the domestic sale and use of Chinese tech company 
Huawei’s products.95 Government leaders cite Huawei as a grave 
threat to national security.96 Countries fear the Chinese 
government can spy on Huawei-device owners through 
“backdoors” installed in Huawei electronic devices.97 When 
referring to accessing a computer system or software, “backdoors” 
are “undocumented portal[s] that allow[] an administrator to 
enter the system to troubleshoot or do upkeep.”98 It can, however, 
also refer to “a secret portal that hackers and intelligence 
agencies use to gain illicit access [to a users’ system].”99 Many 
countries require telecom-equipment manufacturers to build in 
backdoors to information stored on devices for legitimate and 
lawful interception purposes.100 In almost every nation, strict laws 
govern when and how governments may use these backdoors.101 
United States officials warn that Huawei devices can preserve 
access to networks without the carriers’ knowledge or consent.102 
While Huawei has insisted that it has never spied on behalf of any 
country and would refuse a request to do so, Huawei’s backdoors 
make it possible for the Chinese government to access user 
data.103 Based on the country’s laws,104 if the Beijing government 
wanted such access, Huawei would be compelled to provide it.105 
 
95. See Pancevski, supra note 25. 
96. See id. (citing a confidential memo written by the German Foreign Office and 
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5. Facebook Gets Political 
Another danger in unchecked collection and misuse of user 
data is that parties can use the gathered data to manipulate users’ 
future behaviors. In a targeted advertising campaign, an 
algorithm reviews a consumer’s search trends and demographics 
to feed consumers products or information the algorithm 
determines consumers will find satisfactory.106 Targeted 
advertising of products can be beneficial to both consumers and 
marketers. Without targeted advertising, searching the internet 
for a specific item can take hours or days before finding 
something remotely close to the search target. In contrast, data 
gathering applications like Instagram can comb through a user’s 
searches, find the most closely related products to the search 
terms, and recommend the exact item for which the consumer 
spent hours searching.107 For example, a consumer who searches 
for a red, cowl neck, silk dress may encounter an ad on the user’s 
Instagram account advertising the exact dress sold at Nordstrom. 
The user purchases the dress while the manufacturer, Nordstrom, 
makes a sale thanks to Instagram’s targeted advertising to a 
particular consumer. 
While this experience is helpful, even desirable, the ads do 
not stop at clothing. Companies employing this practice collect 
consumers’ information and draw conclusions about the 
consumers’ demographics, which can then be used against the 
consumer through pointed advertising, swaying the consumers’ 
opinions.108 In this way, targeted advertising practices often lead 
to confirmation bias and providers placing unsuspecting 
consumers into echo chambers wherein consumers are shown 
affirmatory articles at the top of their search results, rather than 
relevant and factual information, even if these results do not align 
 
106. See JOE PLUMMER, STEVE RAPPAPORT & TADDY HALL, THE ONLINE ADVERTISING 
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with the user’s views.109 This negative feedback loop, created via 
the same traditionally helpful technology, fuels misinformation 
and leads to amplification of consumers’ preconceived beliefs. 
In 2014, political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica 
secured a US$15 million investment after persuading wealthy 
Republican donor, Robert Mercer, and his political advisor, 
Stephen Bannon, of its ability to sway the 2016 US presidential 
election in their party’s favor.110 Cambridge Analytica boasted 
psychoanalytic tools capable of identifying personality traits of 
American voters that could influence their behavior.111 
Cambridge Analytica planned to use the information obtained 
with these tools to inform targeted political advertising on the 
social media platform Facebook.112 The new algorithm 
Cambridge promised to develop would specifically track users 
who were “more prone to impulsive anger or conspiratorial 
thinking than average citizens.”113 To obtain the necessary data to 
build this tool, the firm “harvested” privileged information from 
more than 50 million Facebook users’ accounts without their 
permission.114 Of the 50 million, approximately 270,000 users had 
consented to sharing their data.115 That means only half of one 
percent of all Facebook users gave permission to Facebook to 
share the data with Cambridge Analytica. After illicitly gaining the 
necessary data to develop this tool, Cambridge used “various 
methods, such as Facebook group posts, ads, sharing articles or 
even creating fake Facebook pages to provoke these [easily 
angered] users.”116 Confirming what many Americans feared 
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from big tech companies, one of Cambridge Analytica’s founding 
members, Christopher Wylie, admitted in an interview that 
“[r]ules don’t matter for [Big Tech company leaders].”117 
Further, reviews of the firm’s emails and documents revealed 
that as of March 2018, years later, Cambridge still possessed most 
or all of the wrongfully gathered data.118 The data collected 
included users’ potentially identifying information including 
name, address, email address, phone number, place of work, etc. 
The collected data also included users’ networks, meaning other 
users with whom the original user has connected, or “friended,” 
and reactions to posts their friends have shared, known as 
“likes.”119 Facebook’s Deputy General Counsel stated that 
Cambridge Analytica certified that all data it had collected has 
since been destroyed.120 Confirming this statement, however, may 
be near impossible since copies of the data remain beyond 
Facebook’s control.121 Aside from Cambridge Analytica not 
obtaining consent from the data’s owners, an especially insidious 
problem with its targeted advertising practice is that it feeds 
consumers products, news stories, and social media posts that 
reflect the consumer’s views, even if those views are deluded, 
conspiratorial, or hateful. Targeted advertising effectively 
prevents providing users with alternative, more credible 
perspectives. 
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO DATA-PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED STATES, AND 
CHINA 
Regarding data and technology, the European Union, the 
United States, and China have set different standards in the way 
of legislative protection.122 The European Union has recently 
enacted one of the most expansive regulations in the data-privacy 
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field: the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).123 
While the United States has some state-adopted statutes, neither 
the United States nor China have federally-binding laws 
protecting general consumer data.124 Though nations around the 
world are racing to be the first to develop AI, two countries forge 
far ahead of the rest: the United States and China. Whoever wins 
this race will “define generations of technology to come.”125 
Given the necessity of access to data in developing AI, Chinese 
companies appear to be better positioned to take the lead. 
China’s over 800 million “netizens,”126—active internet 
community participants—use their cell phones more actively 
than Americans do, thus creating more data on Chinese 
devices.127 As of December 2019, China’s 854 million internet 
users more than double America’s 313 million users.128 Further, 
China’s plans to develop their AI include investing US$7 billion 
in the industry by 2030.129 
The European Union is also investing significantly in the 
field, pledging US$24 billion in a two-year period.130 While the 
United States has not discussed its plans, it is currently the world 
leader in technological development.131 Additionally, while China 
may have the highest number of data contributors, 132 Americans 
still contribute the greatest amount of online content to the 
internet.133 Consumers may fear, however, that nations’ push to 
innovate will encourage governments to allow developers almost 
unfettered use of private data to advance their respective nation’s 
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global stance. On the other hand, technology experts and 
developers worry over-legislation, to protect consumer data 
privacy, will stifle competition and innovation.134 
The United States currently has bills pending before 
Congress calling for greater enforcement of data-privacy 
protections,135 but China’s authoritarian regime will likely never 
codify generalized privacy rights. Some technology experts credit 
this lack of regulation for rapid advancements in technology, 
especially during the internet’s naissance.136 This Part will discuss 
nations’ legislative approaches to combatting data-privacy abuses 
by analyzing various pieces of legislation that have been either 
introduced or enacted as a response to data privacy breaches. 
A. The European Union Enacts One of the Most Comprehensive Data-
Privacy Laws: The GDPR 
According to Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (“TFEU”), the GDPR emerged out of 
necessity from its predecessor, the 1995 European Union Data 
Protection Directive (“1995 Directive”), 137 due to the “rapidly 
changing landscape in data storage, collection, and transfer.” 138 
In light of the TFEU’s mission to establish that data privacy 
protection is a fundamental right,139 the GDPR aims to 
“strengthen, unify, and make more coherent data protection laws 
and its framework across the twenty-seven European Union 
member states.”140 
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The pre-GDPR European Union hoped to solve what is 
currently the United States’ main issue: numerous state-level 
regulations establishing independent policies, rather than a 
unified, federally binding statute. This issue and subsequent ideal 
of a single unifying piece of legislation is precisely why the 
European Commission replaced the 1995 Directive with the 
GDPR.141 In doing so, the European Commission had two goals 
in mind: (1) fixing the imbalance of competition created through 
varying legislation across the European Union, and (2) 
reinforcing its implementation to bolster compliance with the 
European Union’s laws amongst various organizations and 
member states.142 
The GDPR heavily emphasizes consumer protections, setting 
strict requirements for data processors, such as companies and 
data controllers, and use and storage of user data. The regulation 
requires explicit and informed consent from users before 
processors may use their data.143 It also places strict penalties on 
noncompliant corporations to dissuade unfair practices and 
imposes a strict compliance deadline.144 Most importantly, the 
GDPR greatly expands the rights of consumers regarding the use 
of their data.145 
The GDPR requires data subjects146—identified or 
identifiable natural persons—to give clearly established, 
informed, and affirmative consent to data processors147 
responsible for the collection and usage of subjects’ mined 
data.148 Affirmative consent means that “[s]ilence, pre-ticked 
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boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.”149 
The GDPR’s proscription of acceptance-through-silence nullifies 
providers’ abilities to use an “Opt-Out approach” to obtain user 
consent to data usage.150 The Opt-Out method refers to a 
processor’s ability to automatically collect user data, unless the 
user affirmatively manifests an unwillingness to comply.151 
Moreover, the data controller must be able to demonstrate that 
the data subject has consented to the processing of personal data 
through a written agreement “clearly distinguishable from the 
other matters” and presented in an “intelligible and easily 
accessible form.”152 Consent, as required by the GDPR, must 
always be clearly distinguishable from other terms of service and 
cannot be hidden within other text.153 As an example, upon 
visiting many websites for the first time, users are immediately 
presented with a pop-up notice preventing them from navigating 
further without first consenting to privacy policies. Further, the 
GDPR establishes that data subjects must be able to withdraw 
consent “at any time as easily as it was to give consent.”154 In 
enacting this provision, the GDPR requires that data collection be 
purpose-limited, meaning a user’s consent expires upon 
fulfillment of the purpose for which it was collected.155 
Additionally, the GDPR provides for automatic termination of 
consent if the data is no longer necessary for the originally stated 
purpose.156 
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) also recognized the 
right to be forgotten—a right codified in Article 17 of the 
GDPR.157 The right to be forgotten allows data subjects who no 
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https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-8-consent-unlocking-eu-
general-data-protection-regulation [https://perma.cc/Z8KE-QHHE]. 
154. Park, supra note 1, at 1477 (citing GDPR, supra note 18, art. 7, at 3). 
155. See Park, supra note 1, at 1477 (citing Tomain, supra note 50, at 35). 
156. See id. 
157. GDPR, supra note 18, art. 17. 
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longer want their data used or stored by data controllers to 
require the controller remove the data from its system, provided 
there is no legitimate reason for keeping it.158 The right to be 
forgotten does, however, have exceptions. “[T]he right of 
freedom of expression and information, compliance with other 
obligations under the European Union or member state laws, for 
reasons of public interest and public concerns, for archiving 
purposes, and the exercise and establishment of law enforcement 
and legal claims” indemnifies controllers from complying with 
the right to be forgotten under Article 16.159 In the case of Google 
Spain SL v. AEPD and Costeja Gonzalez, the ECJ specified that the 
privacy protection “rights override, as a rule, not only the 
economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also 
the interest of the general public in having access to that 
information.”160 The language of this opinion illustrates the 
degree to which the GDPR prioritizes consumer rights over those 
of a company or even the public’s right to access of information. 
B. Americans and US Legislators Call for Enactment of a Federally 
Binding Data-Privacy Statute 
While the European Union has been successful in legislating 
standards for privacy protection, in the United States, the private 
sector sets standards for consumer data processing and usage. 
Consequently, US legislation is more business-friendly while the 
GDPR focuses more on individuals’ rights.161 This business-
focused legislation emphasizes the significance the United States 
places on the role of business in its society. The United States 
prioritizes competitiveness and the race to innovate over 
consumer autonomy and privacy rights. Even the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”)—the most expansive data 
regulation in the United States—carves out an exception from its 
 
158. Press Release, Speech of Viviane Reding, Eur. Comm’n, The European Union 
Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data 
Protection Rules in the Digital Age 5 (Jan. 22, 
2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/26&f
ormat=PDF [https://perma.cc/D98P-FXJT]; see also GDPR, supra note 18. 
159. GDPR, supra note 18, art. 16. 
160. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 99 (May 13, 2014). 
161. See discussion infra Part III (weighing the pros and cons of such a business-
focused legislation in the United States). 
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privacy interest requirement by providing that the interest be 
“balanced against competing interests, which may be justified if 
legitimate interests derived from legally authorized and socially 
beneficial activities of the government and private entities” 
exist.162 Moreover, the balancing of legitimate privacy interests 
against activities of governmental and private entities favors 
private actors, such as large private data-mining corporations.163 
In support of this view, the California Supreme Court noted 
that individuals have “greater choice in dealing with private actors 
than when dealing with the government.”164 The Court, however, 
seems to overlook the prevalence of monopolies or monopolistic-
like corporations in America. These large corporations wield 
substantial influence over not only how American consumers live 
their daily lives, but also how the world views the United States as 
a competitor in the technological market.165 As one of only two 
nations leading the tech race, 166 the United States must weigh 
appeasing its citizens calling for stronger data protections against 
maintaining their global technological primacy. Many tech and 
corporate leaders fear over-legislation’s impact on technological 
innovation and competition.167 
 
162. Park, supra note 1, at 1469 (citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 
P.2d 633, 655-56 (Cal. 1994)). 
163. See Park, supra note 1, at 1470 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d at 
656). 
164. Park, supra note 1, at 1470 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d at 633, 
656). 
165. See Shaoul Sussman & Matt Stoller, Why Amazon, Facebook, Google and Apple are 
Bad for America, POLITICO (July 28, 2020, 4:30 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/07/28/agenda-amazon-facebook-
google-apple-hearing-383612 [https://perma.cc/VJ73-5SQY]; see also Tom Huddleston 
Jr.,  Bill Gates: ‘Government needs to get involved’ to Regulate Big Tech Companies, CNBC (Oct. 
17, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/17/bill-gates-government-needs-
to-regulate-big-tech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/G69B-P8VQ]. 
166. See, e.g., Audrey Cher, ‘Superpower Marathon’: U.S. May Lead China in Tech Right 
Now — but Beijing has the Strength to Catch Up, CNBC (May 17, 2020, 9:43 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/18/us-china-tech-race-beijing-has-strength-to-catch-
up-with-us-lead.html [https://perma.cc/HF8U-YPYD]. 
167. See Larry Downes, How More Regulation for U.S. Tech Could Backfire, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/how-more-regulation-for-u-s-tech-could-
backfire [https://perma.cc/8KH2-PQB9]. 
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Unlike the European Union, the United States does not 
consider data privacy a fundamental right.168 Nevertheless, 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has found privacy an 
implied protection guaranteed by the US Constitution.169 Noting 
that there does not currently exist a federally-binding statute on 
data-privacy protection, some states have chosen to codify 
protective acts themselves.170 
In 2018, California passed the CCPA. It is the first regulation 
of its kind overseeing business data-collection practices in the 
United States and provides the most comprehensive coverage of 
data-protection.171 Despite tech companies spending millions of 
dollars to oppose Assembly Bill 375 (the bill creating the CCPA), 
it was ultimately passed on June 28, 2018.172 The regulation 
protects consumers’ data privacy in several ways. The CCPA grants 
consumers (1) the right to request businesses delete any of the 
consumer’s personal information; (2) the right to request 
businesses that sell personal information disclose categories of 
information sold and identify third parties to which it was sold; 
and (3) the right to opt out of the sale of their personal 
information.173 As much protection as the CCPA affords 
California consumers, it still errs on the side of protecting 
businesses more than the general public. The bill requires that 
businesses be provided “thirty-day written notice to ‘cure’ any 
 
168. See Park, supra note 1, at 1465 (citing LEE A. BYGRAVE, INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
BY CONTRACT 23, 118 (2015) (noting that a right of privacy is not directly expressed 
anywhere in the US Constitution, including in the Bill of Rights)). 
169. See Park, supra note 1, at 1468 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-65 
(2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). 
170. See generally H.R. 1128, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018) (enacted) 
[hereinafter CCDPA]; A.B. 375, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter CCPA] 
(known as the Colorado Consumer Data Privacy Act and the California Consumer 
Privacy Act, respectively).  
171. See Park, supra note 1, at 1456 (referencing Wakabayashi, supra note 65). 
172. CCPA § 1798.1000; see also Issie Lapowsky, California Unanimously Passes Historic 
Privacy Bill, WIRED (June 28, 2018, 5:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-
unanimously-passes-historic-privacy-bill/ [https://perma.cc/E4P7-3G54]. 
173. Park, supra note 1, at 1472 (citing Lapowsky, supra note 172); Noah 
Ramirez, Can CCPA Affect Your Small Business?, OSANO (Oct. 30, 
2019), https://www.osano.com/articles/ccpa-small-business [https://perma.cc/4KCC-
6FT7]. 
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alleged violations before an action is undertaken.”174 Further, 
except in cases of data breaches, citizens may not bring private 
actions against corporations for privacy-related abuses.175 In 
support of this stance, critics of the CCPA argue that the CCPA 
would otherwise open technology companies up to too much 
liability, hindering their businesses and impinging on their ability 
to hire.176 
In defending consumer rights, section 1798.120(a) of the 
CCPA provides consumers a right to “Opt-Out” of businesses 
selling their data to third parties.177 The provision states 
businesses must inform consumers that their data may be 
distributed and that they have a right to request it not be.178 To 
satisfy this requirement, websites must include a “clear and 
conspicuous link on the business Internet homepage, titled ‘Do 
Not Sell My Personal Information’.”179 This link must provide 
consumers with an “opt out” option.180 After a consumer has 
opted-out, businesses must comply with the request and are not 
allowed to contact the consumer asking permission to sell their 
data again for twelve months.181 
Similar to the GDPR’s right to be forgotten, section 1798.105 
of the CCPA contains a “right to delete” clause.182 The provision 
allows users to request that a business delete any personal 
information it has collected from the user.183 Additionally, the 
business must also notify any third party to whom the business has 
distributed the data of the request.184 Some feel the CCPA will 
 
174. "A consumer may only bring a private lawsuit if they first provide the business 
with thirty-days written notice identifying specific provisions that have been violated.” 
Park, supra note 1, at 1487 (citing CCPA § 1798.150(b)(1)). 
175. “As the CCPA is currently written, only the AG can sue for most violations, with 
an exception for private right of action under section 1798.150.” Park, supra note 1, at 
1487 (citing CCPA § 1798.150(a)(1)). 
176. See Park, supra note 1, at 1473 (citing Lapowsky, supra note 172); see also James 
Harvey & Gavin Reinke, The CCPA Could Reset Data Breach Litigation Risks, JDSUPRA (Aug. 
20, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ccpa-could-reset-data-breach-
14801/ [https://perma.cc/G89A-YUVU]. 
177. CCPA § 1798.120(a). 
178. See id. § 1798.120(b). 
179. Id. § 1798.135(a)(1). 
180. See id. 
181. See id. § 1798.135(a)(5). 
182. Id. § 1798.105(a). 
183. See id. 
184. See id. § 1798.105(c). 
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serve as a precedent in state-level data privacy regulation and 
await other states to follow suit.185 
Currently, there is no federal statute in the United States 
regarding data privacy protection,186 and instead, federal agencies 
stepped in to fill the gap. The Federal Trade Commission has 
broadly relied upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (“FTC Act”) to vindicate consumer protection violations, 
“including in the context of data privacy and security.”187 Section 
5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce.”188 Under the authority allegedly 
vested by Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has been pursuing 
companies who violate data privacy and security practices on an 
individual basis and seeking either injunctive or monetary relief 
against them, citing Section 13(b) of the Act as a grant of 
authority.189 The FTC has found that the monetary pressure of 
paying fines and litigation costs has kept companies compliant 
with Section 5.190 
Currently, however, there are two cases pending before the 
Supreme Court that could potentially constrict the FTC’s 
interpretation of Section 13(b).191 Depending on the outcome, 
 
185. “[D]ata privacy remains high on the agenda of California legislators and will 
likely sweep across the United States as more states jump on the bandwagon to ensure 
greater data protection for its residents.” Park, supra note 1, at 1488. 
186. See Emily Birnbaum & Harper Neidig, State Rules Complicate Push for Federal 
Data Privacy Law, HILL (Mar. 5, 2019 6:00 AM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/432564-state-rules-complicate-push-for-federal-
data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/UV9Z-9SRU]. 
187. Céline M. Guillou, How the FTC’s Enforcement of Data Privacy and Security May be 
Impacted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Upcoming Review of the FTC’s Use of Section 13(b), 
LEXOLOGY (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=37fdf828-
4a9a-4aa2-8f20-f8f6bb0e1ce0 [https://perma.cc/UV9Z-9SRU]. 
188. Federal Trade Commission Act, 75 P.L. 447, 52 Stat. 111, 75 Cong. Ch. 49. 
189. See Guillou, supra note 187. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. (referring to FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 
2019)). In FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, the FTC sued Credit Bureau Center, LLC 
(“Brown”) under §13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 
53(b), alleging that its websites and referral system violated several consumer-protection 
statutes. Upholding the FTC’s victory, the Seventh Circuit found §13(b) of the FTC Act 
provided for injunctive relief and temporary restraining orders, and that both §§45(I) 
and 57b(b) “expressly authorized additional equitable remedies,” but that “section 
13(b) lacked comparable language,” Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d at 764. District 
courts also have authority to order equitable monetary relief under §13(b) of the FTC 
Act. FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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the FTC may be constrained from obtaining equitable relief 
against corporate deceptive or unfair practices.192 Some fear the 
decisions could impact some corporations’ willingness to provide 
transparent, fair, and non-deceptive disclosures to consumers.193 
Others feel the rulings may expand the FTC’s enforcement 
authority by providing clearer guidelines on how the FTC handles 
data privacy and security.194 They argue the many recent 
“egregious corporate data privacy and security fails” may bring 
legislators closer to a federal privacy law.195 Currently, Congress is 
deliberating numerous proposed bills outlining how corporations 
should handle data privacy, security, and enforcement. The 
following Sections examine two of the most comprehensive bills 
pending before Congress: the Consumer Online Privacy Rights 
Act (“COPRA”) and the Digital Accountability and Transparency 
to Advance Privacy Act (“Data Privacy Act”). 
COPRA is a bill introduced in the Senate that sets 
requirements for organizations that collect, process, or share a 
consumer’s data.196 If passed, the bill will require data-gathering 
entities to: (1) make their privacy policies publicly available and 
inform individuals about how their data is being used; (2) delete 
or amend an individual’s data upon request; (3) export reports 
in a readable format, upon request; (4) establish data security 
practices to protect confidentiality and accessibility of consumer 
data; and (5) designate a privacy officer and a data security officer 
to implement and conduct privacy and data security programs 
and risk assessments.197 The bill prohibits companies from, 
among other things, engaging in deceptive or harmful data 
practices, processing or transferring an individual’s sensitive data 
without affirmative express consent, and providing a service or 
product conditioned upon an individual’s waiver of privacy 
rights.198 Additionally, the bill requires the FTC to establish a new 
bureau specifically tasked with enforcing its provisions.199 In sum, 
COPRA holds accountable entities who process personally 
 
192. See id. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. Id. 
196. S. 2968, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). 
197. Id. 
198. S. 2968, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). 
199. See id. 
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identifiable information.200 Aside from accountability, the bill 
gives individuals a right of access, deletion, data minimization, 
and data security.201 Finally, though the bill would be a federal 
statute, it would provide minimum guidelines for state level data-
privacy coverage.202 
Like COPRA, the Data Privacy Act establishes requirements 
for businesses that “collect, process, store, or disclose 
information.”203 Unlike COPRA, however, the bill only places 
security requirements on data processors who collect from at least 
3,000 people per any twelve-month period.204 Further, the bill 
does not cover data pertaining to employment or restrict use of 
publicly available governmental records.205 The Data Privacy Act 
requires businesses to: (1) “provide consumers with accessible 
notice of the business’ privacy practices with respect to such 
information”; and (2) “if meeting a certain revenue threshold, 
appoint a privacy officer to oversee compliance with the 
information privacy standards of the bill.”206 Though the bill 
outlines when a company should appoint a privacy officer, the bill 
does not elaborate as to what that “threshold” is. The bill further 
calls on the FTC to enforce requirements of limiting the scope 
and reasoning, allowing consumers to amend, and examining the 
impact of user data on covered businesses.207 Finally, the bill 
requires the National Science Foundation to include research 
and instructions on encrypting or removing personally 
 
200. See, e.g., Jesse Woo, Jan Whittington & Ronald Arkin, Note, Urban Robotics: 
Achieving Autonomy in Design and Regulation of Robots and Cities, 52 CONN. L. REV. 319, 374 
(2020) (citing Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2978, 116th Cong. § 2(9) (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2968/text. 
[https://perma.cc/E4G9-7E8M]). 
201. See id. (citing Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2978, 116th Cong. §§ 
101-10 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2968/text 
[https://perma.cc/2GYX-RFJ4]). 
202. See id. 
203. Digital Accountability and Transparency to Advance Privacy Act, S. 583, 116th 
Cong. (2019). 
204. See id. 
205. See id. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. 
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identifiable elements from collected consumer data within its 
information security grants program.208 
In sum, the United States does not have federally-binding 
data privacy laws or standard methods of regulation. As such, 
some states209 have taken it upon themselves to create legislation 
protecting consumer data.210 As a response to the plethora of data 
breaches corporations have faced over the past several years,211 
legislators have drafted several proposed bills calling for federal 
data privacy laws, such as COPRA and the Data Privacy Act. 
C. China’s Surveillance State Affords its Citizens Data Protections 
Historically, Chinese laws have offered citizens significantly 
fewer privacy protections than those of other nations.212 Of the 
few privacy laws in place, China’s cybersecurity law (“CSL”)—the 
most comprehensive of any Chinese privacy protection yet 
enacted—213 focuses more on national security than on securing 
individual privacy rights.214 Even in its provisions that do not 
implicate national security, the laws center around consumer 
privacy protections rather than rights derived as citizens.215 Still, 
the CSL, alongside China’s Personal Information Security 
Specification (2018 Specification)—which sets standards for data 
collection, use, and sharing and concisely defines “consent”—216 
is more comprehensive than anything the United States has 
enacted, though it is less stringent than the GDPR. Regarding 
data collection and processing, data breaches, and oversight, the 
CSL resembles US laws.217 Conversely, the 2018 Specification sets 
much stronger protections in the areas of transparency, limiting 
 
208. See Cong. Rsch. Serv., Summary S.583 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), U.S. CONG., 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/583 
[https://perma.cc/2QKK-MUS2] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).  
209. The states referred to are specifically California and Colorado regarding the 
California Consumer Privacy Act and the Colorado Consumer Data Privacy Act, 
respectively. H.R. 1128, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018) (enacted). 
210. See generally CCPA. 
211. See supra Section II.A. 
212. See Lin, supra note 23, at 266 (referencing Fry, supra note 23, at 440). 
213. See Emmanuel Pernot-Leplay, China’s Approach On Data Privacy Law: A Third 
Way Between the U.S. and The European Union?, 8 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 49, 73 (2020). 
214. See Sacks, supra note 27. 
215. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 54. 
216. See Shi et al., supra note 21. 
217. See discussion infra Section III.C.1. 
2021] WHAT'S YOUR PRIVACY WORTH? 1181 
additional processing, and increasing autonomy rights, echoing 
the same protections enumerated in the GDPR.218 
1. Sections of the CSL Bear Resemblance to United States Laws 
a. Data Collection and Processing Requirements: Consent and 
Data Quality 
In the European Union, lawfulness of data processing 
depends on legal principles of: (1) consent from the data subject; 
(2) a contract to which the data subject is party; (3) the necessity 
of processing data to advance vital interests; (4) compliance with 
any legal obligations; (5) the carrying-out of a task in the public 
interest; or (6) the necessity of processing data for the “legitimate 
interests of the data controller unless the rights and freedoms of 
the data subject override them.”219 However, in the United States 
and China, the main determinant of the legality of data 
processing is this first principle: consent.220 The United States, 
European Union, and China all require data subjects’ consent to 
data controllers’ use and processing of their data, though Article 
6 of the GDPR defines giving consent much narrower than the 
United States and China do.221 In the European Union, consent 
must be “freely given, informed and unambiguous, which 
excludes implicit consent.”222 The United States requires an 
individual to consent to data processing,223 but infers such 
consent from a user using a website that has privacy policies 
rather than requiring explicit consent.224 Similarly, China’s CSL 
 
218. See discussion infra Section III.C.2. 
219. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 83 (drawing from the Directive 
95/46/EC, UK’s DP Act of 1998 and Netherland’s WBP (which are laws implementing 
the Directive), the OECD Guidelines, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 in the 
United States). 
220. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213; see also infra Section IV.A.1. 
221. See GDPR, supra note 18, art. 6. 
222. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 83 (summarizing the definition of consent as 
laid out in the GDPR art. 6). 
223. See Paul M. Schwartz, The European Union-U.S. Privacy Collision: a Turn To 
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1976-77 (2013); see also Noah Ramirez, 
Data Privacy Laws: What You Need to Know in 2020, OSANO (Nov. 8, 2020), 
https://www.osano.com/articles/data-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/G4ZA-VS6Z].  
224. Default collection is permissible in the absence of a law explicitly forbidding 
it. See Schwartz supra note 223, at 1976 (distinguishing between the EU data regime and 
that of the United States, noting “the United States does not rely on a notion that 
personal information cannot be processed in the absence of a legal authorization. 
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requires only consent for data collection and processing and 
allows for consent to be implied.225 Nonetheless, the CSL does not 
allow for default collection or processing.226 It includes 
exemptions to obtaining consent which overlap with some of the 
GDPR’s legal bases. Consent is unnecessary for purposes of 
protecting national security, preserving public health, 
conducting criminal investigations, protecting lives or “major 
lawful rights” of the data subject, or accessing previously lawfully 
and publicly disclosed information.227 
Another distinction between the data protection regimes of 
the three states is their treatment of data quality. The data quality 
principle, as outlined in the GDPR, necessitates that personal 
data intended for collection be “accurate and, where necessary, 
kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure 
that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the 
purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified 
without delay.”228 The United States sets data quality standards in 
some federal laws, but unevenly applies its principles across state 
laws.229 Again, following the United States’ vague application of 
privacy practices, neither the CSL nor the 2018 Specification 
mention data quality.230 Regarding consent and data quality, 
China seems to follow the United States’ lead on systematic 
application of privacy principles. 
b. Data Breach Repercussions and Oversight Committees 
Protection of data security is essential to maintaining 
confidentiality and security of users’ personal data. When data 
 
Rather, it permits information collection and processing unless a law specifically forbids 
the activity.”). 
225. Drafters of the CSL and the 2018 Specification stated that explicit consent is 
only required where the phrase “explicit consent” is expressly written, not everywhere 
“consent” is used. See Samm Sacks, China’s Emerging Data Privacy System and GDPR, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-
emerging-data-privacy- system-and-gdpr [https://perma.cc/8WR5-NFWZ] [hereinafter 
Sacks II]. 
226. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 84. 
227. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 85 (referencing 2018 Specification art. 
5.4 (a)-(f)). 
228. GDPR, supra note 18, art. 5.1(d). 
229. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C § 552a(e)(5); see also discussion supra 
Section III.B. 
230. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 86. 
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breaches occur, most nations require data controllers to provide 
notification of such breaches.231 The European Union has 
dedicated supervisory authorities in place to monitor data 
breaches.232 On the other hand, the United States and China do 
not have designated oversight committees. Moreover, the 
consequences for a data controller’s inaction after a breach has 
occurred also differs by nation. 
The CSL contains a vague requirement of security for 
personal data.233 The 2018 Specification is similarly vague, but 
explicitly mentions that “data controllers should ‘possess the 
appropriate security capacity taking into account the security risks 
faced, and employ sufficient management and technical 
measures to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of personal information.’”234 In the event of a data breach, all 
three states require disclosure to authorities and specify steps to 
remediation. China’s CSL requires data controllers to inform not 
only authorities, but also compromised individuals of such 
breaches.235 The 2018 Specification specifies such requirements 
and compels companies to give full incident reports to 
enforcement agencies in the event of a breach and conduct 
cybersecurity drills annually.236 The laws require data controllers 
to inform authorities and individuals of the breach “promptly,” 
but does not specify a timeframe.237 Similarly, most US statutes 
only require notifications to be made within a reasonable time.238 
In the European Union, however, data controllers must notify 
supervisory authorities within seventy-two hours of the controller 
 
231. See id. 
232. See id. 
233. CSL articles 40 and 42 set out certain, vague requirements such as network 
operators maintaining user confidentiality over the information they collect, establishing 
protection systems, and adopting measures that ensure protection of the personal 
information they gather. See Creemers, supra note 20. 
234. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 87 (quoting 2018 Specification art. 4 (f)). 
235. See Creemers, supra note 20, art. 42. 
236. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 88-89 (citing 2018 Specification arts. 9.1(a), 
(b)). 
237. Id. at 89. 
238. See, e.g., California Data Security Breach Notification Law, § 1798.29 (a), 
1798.82 (a) (California S.B. 1386) (stating “disclosures shall be made in the most 
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay”). 
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becoming aware of the breach.239 They also must notify the data 
subject if there is a risk to their safety or autonomy.240 
Regarding oversight committees, the European Union 
follows the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (“OECD Privacy 
Guidelines”) for data privacy.241 The United States does not have 
a designated regulatory oversight authority but distributes 
oversight responsibilities among a broad array of government 
bodies including: the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), 
state attorneys general, the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), and more.242 Of these, the FTC has assumed the 
responsibility of enforcing privacy protections in the United 
States.243 China’s CSL also delegates data protection to several 
regulators, rather than a single organized, EU-style task force.244 
Chinese authorities take a sectorial approach to regulation but 
fall short of effectively delegating responsibility among oversight 
groups.245 
Another issue with these systems is the enforcement of 
violation penalties. Chinese companies responsible for data 
breaches may face fines for their actions, but those fines are 
limited to the greater of either “RMB 1,000,000 (USD 150,000) 
or ten times the amount of unlawful gains from the misuse of 
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244. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 90 (referring to Article 8 of the CSL). 
245. See Bo Zhao & G.P. (Jeanne) Mifsud Bonnici, Protecting EU Citizens’ Personal 
Data in China: a Reality or a Fantasy?, 24 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 128, 135 (2016). 
2021] WHAT'S YOUR PRIVACY WORTH? 1185 
data.”246 This fine may seem insignificant to large corporations, 
however the CSL grants regulators the authority to “temporarily 
suspend business operations, shut down the website or even 
cancel business licenses and relevant operations permits . . . ” 
upon a company’s breach of data privacy.247 
In comparison, China’s sectoral regulation of data breach 
violations resembles the United States’ approach whereby several 
different oversight committees are responsible for responding to 
data security breaches.248 Enforcement of violations in both 
nations is based on a case-by-case analysis, with set maximums for 
monetary enforcement.249 On the contrary, while the GDPR 
allows regulators to issue fines based on company turnover, those 
fines tend to be highly deterrent and are enforced by a designated 
data breach security team.250 
2. China’s Laws Echo the GDPR on Key Issues 
Two principles central to the GDPR are the data 
minimization principle and the sensitivity principle. In the 2018 
Specification, China has adopted standards mirroring the GDPR 
on these two topics. The United States, on the other hand, barely 
refers to them. 
a. Transparent Data Usage Practices and Limitations on 
Additional Processing 
The data minimization principle, as expressly outlined in the 
GDPR, allows data collection and processing of only the 
minimum amount of data necessary to fulfil the purpose for 
which it was collected.251 Once the data controller no longer 
needs the data, the principle requires its erasure.252 In the United 
States, the Privacy Act mandates governmental records contain 
“only such information about an individual as is relevant and 
necessary to accomplish a purpose,”253 though the Act does not 
provide limitations on retention periods. Additionally, neither 
 
246. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 91. 
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the FTC nor the CPPA explicitly mention the principle.254 Suffice 
to say, application of the principle across the United States is 
inconsistent, at best. 
China’s CSL and 2018 Specification seem to reflect the 
GDPR in their approach to the data minimization principle. The 
CSL prohibits collection of personal data unrelated to a 
legitimate purpose and requires network operators acting as data 
controllers to follow the data minimization principle.255 The 2018 
Specification further requires data collectors to follow the data 
minimization principle and delete data when the original 
purpose for collection is fulfilled.256 
The second principle facilitating transparent data practices 
is the sensitivity principle. This concept recognizes that certain 
content necessitates additional safety protections based on the 
sensitivity of the information contained therein.257 Some 
information, such as credit card numbers and bank account 
information, should be protected more stringently than a user’s 
fantasy football picks because of the consequences of stealing 
one’s financial information, like identity theft, loss of finances, 
credit depreciation, and much more. Unlike the US public 
regime,258 the GDPR adheres to this principle and considers 
information such as socioeconomic background, political 
opinions, religious beliefs, union membership, criminal 
convictions, and genetic or biometric data as some of the 
protected classes of personal data.259 While both China and the 
European Union place increased protective measures on sensitive 
data, China adopts a risk-based approach to classifying data as 
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“sensitive.”260 According to the risk-based definition, sensitive 
data are “those that, if disclosed or altered, could endanger the 
safety of persons or property, harm personal reputation and 
physical or psychological health, lead to discriminatory 
treatment, etc.”261 Overall, the European Union is the leader in 
regulating and codifying privacy protections, followed by China 
which adopts similar protections with a governmental exception 
to user data access and usage. The United States, thus, falls 
behind both the European Union and China in privacy 
protection regulations. 
3. Even with New Privacy Protections, China Remains a 
Surveillance State 
While protections are increasing through the passing of the 
CSL and the 2018 Specification, the Chinese government still 
enforces laws allowing for the gathering and mining of citizens’ 
data, citing national security protection in doing so.262 The CSL, 
as groundbreaking as it is, allows many opportunities for lawful 
governmental and third-party encroachment upon citizens’ 
privacy rights.263 Both the public and private sectors use data-
gathering methods, as required by law, to assist in government 
surveillance of Chinese citizens, including the “citizen score”264 
system.265 The “citizen score” is a government owned, privately 
operated, system whereby citizens are monitored then ranked 
based on their behavior and trustworthiness in the government’s 
eyes.266 Many feel this public-private sector collaboration fuels a 
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Chinese effort to become the first nation to actualize an 
omnipresent “algorithmic surveillance” system.267 The impacts of 
such a system will greatly alter how Chinese citizens and 
corporations operate within the nation. 
Today’s technological business model is largely dependent 
upon data-sharing.268 Consequently, data-gathering and AI-
powered surveillance technology have become deeply ingrained 
in China’s economic infrastructure.269 One of China’s largest 
companies, Alibaba, operates the social media app Sesame 
Credit.270 The app enables Alibaba to monitor financial consumer 
behavior of 100,000 Chinese citizens.271 Alibaba has privatized 
China’s “citizen score” system through its user data-gathering 
practices and character-rating system.272 This system helps 
maintain Alibaba’s stature as one of the most competitive e-
commerce companies in the world.273 As the most successful of 
the only eight companies chosen to develop a credit scoring 
system for the country, Alibaba is dominating the market, leaving 
little room for competitors.274 While the government may 
appreciate Alibaba’s product development, the company now 
holds a monopolistic-like control over the market.275 
While this rating system greatly benefits China’s economy, 
the lack of privacy laws within this scheme has mixed impacts on 
its citizens. Privacy intrusions such as cameras covering the 
majority of every block,276 governmental phone-tapping, and 
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other known methods of surveillance are widespread.277 Many 
regard the city of Chongqing as the most surveilled city in the 
world.278 Chongqing boasts a “[r]atio of one CCTV camera for 
every 5.9 citizens.”279 This surveillance regime has led Chinese 
citizens, particularly those of Muslim minority groups such as the 
Uighurs,280 to significantly alter their behavior to meet China’s 
various requirements.281 While Chinese citizens have reported 
ways in which this system has positively impacted their lives (e.g., 
facilitating the return of publicly lost items),282 the ramifications 
of failing to comply with the communist regime have considerably 
negative impacts on citizens as well.283 The United Nations has 
noted one particularly catastrophic impact of the regime, calling 
the mandatory “re-education centers” in China akin to 
concentration camps.284 Chinese authorities have described these 
re-education centers as “vocational training and re-education 
programmes that aim to alleviate poverty and counter terrorism 
threats.”285 In reality, these centers are filled with Muslim citizens, 
targeted “for ‘offences’ as trivial as owning a Qur’an, or 
abstaining from eating pork.”286 In these so-called “vocational 
training programs,” detained inmates endure forced labor, 
torture, medical neglect, and coercive birth control.287 Outside of 
these camps, Uighur families continue to suffer egregious 
intrusions into their lives with forced quartering of Han Chinese 
officials residing inside Uighur homes as an extra measure of 
surveillance.288 In sum, China’s surveillance state can benefit and 
harm its citizens, while corporations such as Alibaba seem to 
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thrive under the data-gathering-friendly regime. It is possible to 
use this surveillance power as a force for good, but the question 
remains on whether the Chinese government can be trusted to 
not abuse this power. So far, widespread abuse of this power 
proves China cannot. 
Overall, nations vary greatly in their enforcement of citizen 
data-security provisions. While the European Union’s 
implementation of the GDPR provides citizens with the greatest 
privacy protections, its impact on corporations poses such risks of 
stifling innovation that many feel no EU tech companies will be 
able to compete with the likes of US and Chinese corporations on 
the global market.289 The United States may not have federal 
protections for citizens’ privacy comparable to those the GDPR 
affords Europeans, however, with looser requirements, US 
companies are free to develop their technology at faster rates, 
thus pushing the nation toward the front of the tech race.290 
Citing recent data-privacy breaches, however, Americans are 
currently calling for reform.291 Legislators have introduced 
numerous draft bills—currently awaiting deliberation in 
Congress—that can regulate corporate America’s use of user data 
by encouraging stronger consumer protections and more 
transparent privacy practices.292 US legislators hope their bills will 
achieve what China’s new laws currently do: promote corporate 
accountability by protecting data subjects’ private information.293 
Even with more regulation than the United States, China’s lack of 
organized oversight committees leaves citizens nearly helpless in 
any attempt at recourse against data abuse practices.294 Moreover, 
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the privacy principles set out in the new laws exempt the 
government from their requirements when it acts in the name of 
national security.295 While China’s constant surveillance of its 
cities may make some feel safer, the country’s monitoring system 
provides a clear path to the dissolution of anonymity. 
IV. THE FINE LINE BETWEEN CONSUMER DATA 
PROTECTION AND OVER-LEGISLATION 
The United States’ current enforcement of data privacy 
protections is inconsistent and defective. Lacking a federally-
binding statute, the current state-by-state legislative framework 
leads to uneven data protection practices across the nation.296 
Additionally, the United States lacks a properly established 
oversight committee dedicated to the enforcement of data 
security.297 The FTC has assumed this role and has undertaken 
the task of enforcing data privacy standards set out in various 
pieces of legislation.298 Without uniform standards, however, the 
FTC imposes fines and disciplinary actions on a case-by-case basis, 
increasing the likelihood of differing penalties for similar 
violations of hazy standards.299 
The European Union, by adopting the GDPR, has avoided 
the American problem of inefficient, opaque data-privacy 
protections by setting clear guidelines for compliance and 
enforcement.300 While adopting a GDPR-like federal statute may 
solve the United States’ transparency problem, the consequences 
of such rigid data regulation could jeopardize its position in the 
global tech market.301 While it is true that the United States needs 
to do more to establish clear data protection measures, a GDPR-
sized regulation would be too stifling to competition and hurt the 
United States more than it protects American citizens.302 
This Part begins by weighing the good that comes from the 
GDPR against the risk of stifling technological development in 
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EU companies. It then analyzes how a GDPR-sized legislation 
would be harmful to the United States.303 Finally, this Part ends 
with suggestions on how the United States should balance 
economic competitiveness and the sufficiency of its data 
protections. 
A. GDPR Takes Big Steps Against Big Tech 
The GDPR’s enactment prompted a divided reaction 
amongst business owners, tech experts, and foreign nations.304 On 
one side of the divide are numerous data abuse victims seeking 
stronger data privacy protections and proper enforcement. In the 
wake of numerous data abuse scandals,305 some consumers began 
favoring the privacy protections offered by the GDPR.306 The 
GDPR’s strict enforcement of data protections can help victims of 
data misuse to feel vindicated through fining or prosecuting data 
privacy abusers. On the other side of the divide were small 
businesses, techies,307 and large corporations dependent upon 
data to drive technology.308 
The GDPR set out rules providing for legal certainty, 
opening the doors for increased consumer trust in data-driven 
technology. The GDPR assuaged tensions over mistrust in tech by 
assuring consumers that when a company oversteps, there will be 
repercussions.309 This, in turn, allows data owners to feel safer in 
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allowing companies access to their data, knowing the stakes for 
misuse are extremely high. Likewise, the cost to businesses for 
non-compliance equates to millions of dollars in fines.310 These 
fines not only hold companies accountable for their actions but 
can also serve as a deterrent to other potential data-abusers.311 
Many companies, especially small business owners, fear for their 
financial futures with the GDPR’s incommensurate fines.312 
B. The United States Needs Stronger Data Protections, But Adopting 
Overbroad Regulation Would Be Overwhelming 
The United States currently lacks proper data protection 
measures including regulation, oversight, and uniformity. 
Without stronger and clearer data protections, the government’s 
case-by-case analysis of what constitutes data abuse313 becomes 
blurred, leading to uneven application of various laws and 
arbitrarily set remedies. On the other hand, enacting a GDPR-
sized regulation would stifle technological innovation and 
competition, and, as a result, threaten the United States’ lead 
over China in the race to develop technology. 
The United States’ current data privacy enforcement 
measures lack uniformity. Absent a federally binding data 
protection statute, many companies are left to grapple with the 
myriad of state and vaguely applicable federal laws currently in 
place. Many companies become confused while trying to comply 
with these disorderly policies,314 leading to some good faith 
businesses adhering to unnecessarily cautious practices at high 
costs.315 Compliance complications may frustrate some 
companies, leading to their outright refusal to use data-insights. 
While this will certainly ensure the company does not run into 
data privacy non-compliance issues, it can also stifle future 
innovation and efficiency. For companies of any size, data insights 
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can drive success. Using these insights does not exclusively entail 
marketing via targeted advertising. A company can use data to 
understand and improve performance in stores and online, 
understand consumers, and make more informed business 
decisions.316 The government must provide more clarity 
regarding what compliance entails while preserving companies’ 
ability to innovate.317 Adopting the GDPR may solve America’s 
enforcement-transparency problem but would be too costly for 
American businesses. 
One of the biggest issues the GDPR faces is balancing 
protection for consumers against the cost to technological 
innovation by restricting developers’ access to data. The CCPA, 
following many key GDPR principles, also faces this issue. The 
GDPR and the CCPA are rigid in what they require of businesses, 
and many fear this rigidity will hurt innovation and cost the 
United States its position on the global technology market.318 
China is the only rival to the United States in the 
technological development sector. Currently, the United States is 
ahead of China in the AI industry which data fuels.319 China, 
however, is quickly catching up, worrying some American 
technology experts and businesses.320 The Huawei 
cyberespionage scandal highlighted some such American 
concerns.321 The more exposed data is to Chinese corporations, 
the more autonomy users risk losing when handing control over 
to Huawei.322 China leading the tech race would compromise 
more than just American innovation, but also threaten US 
national security as pervasive surveillance becomes the norm.323 
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While testifying before Congress, Facebook founder and 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg urged legislators to recognize the careful 
balance between requiring entities to obtain consent for sensitive 
data collection and providing American companies room to 
innovate.324 Over-regulation would place such stringent 
requirements on entities that, Zuckerberg argued, America would 
risk “fall[ing] behind Chinese competitors.”325 Zuckerberg is not 
wrong. Chinese companies, while complying with the CSL and 
2018 Specification, are already hoarding mass amounts of user 
data.326 For example, Chinese tech giant Tencent Holdings’ social 
media apps QQ and WeChat collect user data through their 
messages, including those that users have deleted.327 This data 
storage system is accessible to interested authorities, which 
includes the Chinese government.328 WeChat rivals Apple’s App 
Store in availability of instant in-app downloads.329 With access to 
data from all of China’s WeChat users, new regulation limiting 
much of American companies’ access to American data will hold 
back the United States in the race for AI dominance. 
The GDPR is so stifling to competition that even if the 
United States considers forming alliances to propel it to the front 
of the tech race, it is highly unlikely it will even consider 
collaborating with any of the twenty-seven EU member states 
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party to the GDPR and agree to abide by the GDPR’s 
constrictions. Even if it does, the GDPR may not allow data 
information exchange within such collaborations. The data 
localization feature of the GDPR prohibits data sharing with non-
EU member states lacking “adequate” levels of data protection.330 
As a result of its enactment, companies scrambled to adapt 
their policies to the GDPR rules by the designated compliance 
deadline of May 25, 2018.331 Instead of restructuring their entire 
practice in an incredibly short period of time, businesses instead 
began “pulling users out of reach of European Union privacy laws 
or blocking European Union citizens’ access to online services” 
to avoid the GDPR’s harsh repercussions for non-compliance.332 
Many tech magnates, including Chinese business mogul and 
Alibaba Group co-founder Jack Ma, feel the GDPR’s rigidity is 
responsible for Europe’s lack of technological innovation, 
keeping them out of the tech race by producing substantially 
fewer big tech firms as nations like the United States and China.333 
Ma, in response to the GDPR, urged legislators of all nations to 
focus less on tightening data-usage requirements and instead on 
enacting laws with innovative capacity in mind.334 In support of 
his suggestion, Ma cited China as a prime example of how a lack 
of regulation was critical in allowing the early internet and mobile 
phones to “flourish” and enable “Alibaba to thrive.”335 He warned 
that Europe’s tendency to regulate immediately upon hearing 
concerns over privacy issues will halt the union’s technological 
development.336 Ma gets to the heart of nations’ apprehension to 
sign onto the GDPR: technology is the way of the future and 
 
330. See Andrew Rossow, The Birth Of GDPR: What It Is and What You Need To Know, 
FORBES (May 25, 2018, 7:32 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/25/the-birth-of-gdpr-what-is-it-
and-what-you-need-to-know/?sh=a71f85e55e5b [https://perma.cc/C9TV-U3NJ]. 
331. See Park, supra note 1, at 1467-68. 
332. See id. (citing Alex Hern, Facebook Moves 1.5bn Users Out of Reach of New 
European Privacy Law, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/19/facebook-moves-15bn-users-
out-of-reach-of-new-european-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/E3Z5-H23F]). See also 
Bloomberg, Blocking 500 Million Users Is Easier than Complying with GDPR, FORTUNE (May 
25, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/05/25/gdpr-compliance-lawsuits/ 
[https://perma.cc/DJB4-HZJ3]). 
333. See Soo, supra note 134. 
334. See id. 
335. See id. 
336. See id. 
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under the GDPR’s stifling regime, there will be no room for 
growth, knocking signatory nations aside as China and the United 
States continue to lead the world during this technological 
revolution. 
Some feel Europe is right to regulate technology, citing 
concerns over citizens’ rights and well-being rather than focusing 
on “money, power and technological innovation.”337 This belief, 
however, betrays a narrow conception of technology’s role in our 
society and polarizes the issue. Ma is correct that legislation 
should consider technological progression needs in adopting 
consumer protection laws. Technology is at the forefront of 
society and ignoring the need for continued development not 
only disregards our general reliance on technology, but reduces 
the likelihood of future tech-assisted breakthroughs for 
individuals or companies. 
In addition to over-regulating tech, the administrators of the 
GDPR wield the regulation’s punitive power too aggressively. The 
fines GDPR regulation committees impose on data abusers may 
be too harsh in certain scenarios, especially when small-businesses 
are subjected to the GDPR’s one-size-fits-all punitive system.338 
Under the GDPR, one violation can cost startups their business. 
To ensure compliance, a business may be spending an exorbitant 
amount on compliance officers, licenses, and reporting measures, 
before even beginning its venture. Additionally, the business must 
sacrifice time that would be better spent developing the startup 
to ensure survival of the venture itself.339 Once in place, the fines 
continue, becoming even more expensive for a business’ failure 
to maintain compliance standards.340 According to the Financial 
Times, the more governmental oversight there is over a business’s 
 
337. Why Europe is right to regulate tech: Jack Ma got it wrong, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
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daily operations, the slower the growth of the business in a time 
where speed is one of the most important factors in technological 
development.341 In contrast, the CCPA fixes a maximum fine on 
violations at US$ 7,500, an amount that is practically negligible to 
tech giants. 342 Further, the statute only punishes intentional 
violations which result in data breaches.343 
Proponents of the GDPR cite consumer satisfaction at the 
enactment of the regulation. In the wake of numerous data-abuse 
scandals, the GDPR helps victims feel vindicated through its 
enforcement of protections and implementation of stronger 
penalties for transgressors. Advocates also emphasize the notion 
of a society more trusting of corporations as an effect of more 
transparent data-usage practices.344 In theory, people may begin 
feeling more comfortable living alongside technology by 
understanding how companies use their data for good. This, in 
turn, may create technology and AI investors where once these 
individuals felt distanced from technology. Additionally, 
supporters of the GDPR feel the European Union’s adoption of 
the regulation will encourage other jurisdictions to increase their 
regulation and legislation of data privacy protection, as China 
has. 
C. What the United States Should Do 
The United States should enact a federally binding privacy 
law. This law must protect citizens, provide clear compliance 
guidelines and standards for corporations, and allow room for 
innovation. To accomplish these goals, the new statute should 
preempt state laws for uniformity purposes. Allowing states to 
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on a data breach be $7,500). 
343. See id. 
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continue creating their own specifications exacerbates the issue 
of corporations fronting the cost of complying with disparate 
regulations and risking accidental non-compliance. While 
allowing states to use the federal act as a default regulation may 
provide for greater safety measures within that region, the burden 
of state-by-state adaptations of the federally binding statute will 
overwhelm compliance officers, frustrating technological 
innovation efforts. Data transfers, whether from owner to 
processor or processor to third party, etc., implicate interstate 
commerce, triggering a host of additional compliance issues with 
local level regulation. 
As it currently stands, legislators are submitting numerous 
local GDPR-sized bills, flooding their state legislatures at a rapid 
rate.345 Ensuring continued compliance in an evolving legal 
landscape is a business in itself and would be a “logistic 
nightmare.”346 A single, federal privacy bill with clear terms would 
ameliorate the flooding problem the current pending legislation 
is about to create. In unifying compliance requirements, this 
single bill would take the pressure of accidental non-compliance 
off businesses and leave them free to do what they do best: 
innovate. The GDPR’s uniformity is one of its redeeming 
qualities. As stifling as it is, the GDPR provides a uniform standard 
for compliance so companies and consumers know their rights 
and obligations. However, the GDPR and the CCPA, while 
successful in some capacities, might not be suitable for federal 
application, placing too much responsibility on tech operators 
unfamiliar with legal compliance operations.347 
To accomplish the goal of providing clear compliance 
standards, new legislation should feature clear terms that frame 
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compliance in an easily understandable way. Some could argue 
broader laws allow for greater flexibility—a principle-based 
regulatory regime may be more accommodating to startups than 
a rules-based approach. On the other hand, vaguely defined key 
legal terms can lead to confusion regarding what constitutes 
compliance.348 With clearer terms, companies will have a better 
sense of what compliance entails. This seemingly obvious solution 
will help entities continue to innovate while complying with the 
law and without placing an undue burden on them. 
Many agree that data processors should first obtain consent 
before mining a user’s data.349 Consent, however, is not as clear a 
term as it may seem. One data privacy principle providing for 
more transparent practices includes requiring “Opt-In,” rather 
than “Opt-Out” consent. Opt-In consent requires data processors 
to receive the data subjects’ “express, affirmative and informed 
consent” before processing their data.350 This can either mean: 
(1) a subject affirmatively agrees to allow a processor complete 
use and disclosure of his data or, (2) by agreeing to the 
processor’s terms, the user allows the processor to use the data of 
any other on the same browser with the same IP address on which 
the original user accepted the processor’s terms.351 For example, 
in this second definition, in a household that shares one 
computer, one resident agreeing to a processor’s terms 
automatically means the processor may use any data stored on the 
computer, regardless of which household member generated 
such data. These two constructions of the term “Opt-In 
requirement” represent only a couple of ways in which “consent” 
may be interpreted. To avoid the ambiguity in the situation set 
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out above, this new privacy statute should clearly define consent 
while establishing stringent compliance standards. 
A federal data privacy statute should require processors 
obtain consent to data gathering, processing, mining, and 
distributing from the user, with an option for users to decline all 
data-usage methods while retaining access to the processor’s 
services. The processor may incentivize sharing data but may not 
coerce consent. The processor must first obtain consent from the 
data subject before sharing his data with a third party. The data 
processor must explicitly state to whom the user’s data is 
distributed and for what purpose(s). Each time the processor 
wants to share user data with another party, the processor must 
re-obtain consent from the original user. 
Even with clear terms, some processors fear obtaining 
consent will be detrimental to their ability to process data and 
thus limit their ability to innovate.352 On the contrary, most tech 
users will not care to read terms and conditions and will often 
click “I agree” when prompted. For the minority who have 
concerns about their data’s usage, however, they can opt out of 
data-share feature without having to forego using a company’s 
product. So, some may question why service providers and 
regulators should care about the scant minority of users who do 
not want to share their data in exchange for using a company’s 
services. Assuming only one percent of the US population cares 
to read terms and conditions and would have a problem with 
sharing their data, that equals about 3.3 million people.353 The 
services these millions of Americans cannot use include those of 
giants like Google, Amazon, Walmart, and more. While one 
percent may seem insignificant, it is enough users to cause 
potential economic turmoil for even some of the largest 
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corporations. Google’s annual revenue is US$ 160.74 billion.354 In 
the US alone, Google has 246 million users.355 This means a loss 
of one percent of Google’s US users will cost Google over US$ 
1.607 billion per year. This example shows the impact to massive 
corporations: the consequences of losing even one percent of 
customers overnight to average-sized businesses would be 
devastating. 
While corporate data mishandling scandals continue to 
surface as quickly as levels of user mistrust grow, no amount of 
abuse is likely to push users completely offline and end society’s 
dependence upon the internet. Despite rising data misconduct, 
few users have followed through on their threats of shutting down 
their social media accounts.356 For this reason, consumer 
protection needs to be at the forefront of drafters’ concerns, 
alongside the idea that reliance upon American-developed 
technology will only improve the United States’ global market 
stance. 
A new federal privacy bill should explicitly establish a 
regulatory enforcement committee. If the drafters of the new law 
choose to accept that regulatory oversight is the FTC’s role, it 
should clearly delineate the FTC’s powers. The best idea would 
be to establish a designated task force exclusively committed to 
data privacy security, whether that be a bureau under the FTC or 
a new federal agency altogether. This task force would replace the 
current redundancy of compliance officers, centralizing oversight 
in one task force. Compliance standards as well as repercussions 
should be clearly enumerated in the regulation along with 
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explicit data storage expiration dates, setting clear guidelines for 
this new task force’s powers. 
With this new committee, the United States should hold 
accountable corporations who have misused user data by enacting 
uniform, binding legislation that calls for more transparent data-
usage practices. “More transparent practices” can include using 
“explainable AI”357 and obtaining consent from consumers 
before sharing their data. Explainable AI refers to only using 
computer algorithms that humans can comprehensively 
understand, thus allowing coders to know what decisions the 
computer makes and why.358 The more data consumers give to 
tech companies, the more these companies can develop and 
increase the United States’ tech standing, but many question if 
they can trust the hands in which their data ends up.359 
Explainable AI practices may alleviate these fears by producing 
coders capable of explaining how computers use data and to what 
ends. The GDPR enumerates similar practices, some of which the 
Digital Accountability and Transparency to Advance Privacy Act 
(“Data Privacy Act”) has already introduced in the Senate.360 
Like the GDPR, the CCPA provides that data breaches are 
not the only form of non-compliance.361 Where there are no 
breaches, the company in question will face no penalties, 
regardless of whether other company policies were compliant.362 
This system may, on its face, seem to promote companies acting 
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to restrict the number of data breaches that occur. However, 
these laws merely incentivize companies to not get caught instead 
of promoting the consumer interest in corporations instituting 
sufficient data protection measures.363 
To determine proper damages for non-compliance, a federal 
law should include a percentage-based formula. Some observers 
propose an algorithm that suggests fining a company for a 
“maximum of two percent of its global revenue for its first 
violation, and four percent for its second violation, etc.”364 This 
proportionality principle would ease startups’ concerns over 
being fined gross sums for mistakes at a time when they are 
unlikely to have a developed compliance framework. At the same 
time, major corporations and tech giants cannot brush aside the 
fines which can amount to millions, dependent upon the 
company’s revenue. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the world continues to advance toward an AI-driven 
future, nations around the world have taken steps to protect 
consumer data privacy interests. The European Union enacted 
the GDPR to secure individual data interests against corporate 
misuse of privileged information. The expansive legislation, 
however, neglects the businesses from which it protects 
consumers, leaving many companies confused or unwilling to 
comply with such stringent requirements that threaten to halt 
technological advancement in favor of securing citizens’ data. 
China, on the other hand, historically affords its citizens few 
privacy rights, yet even the surveillance state has enacted 
measures to prevent against unfettered data-collection. Lagging 
behind the two other bodies, the United States has several local 
acts aimed at residents of certain states but lacks a federally 
binding data privacy statute. With China and the United States 
paving the way through this technological revolution, the United 
States must step up to ensure its citizens’ privacy interests are 
protected, while guaranteeing American companies’ ability to 
innovate will not be stifled by over-regulation of data access. 
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In an ideal world, companies would voluntarily implement 
privacy policies that guarantee consumers fair practices and 
promise not to overstep privacy bounds. Realistically, the 
likelihood of companies acting against their best interests in favor 
of their customers is impractical and foolish. Unreasonable as 
well is the idea that companies would willingly or even have the 
means to ensure their policies comply with countless local-level 
statutes. The United States would therefore benefit from a 
federally binding data protection statute whose requirements are 
clearly and concisely spelled out, unlike those of the GDPR. This 
new statute should incorporate successful aspects of the GDPR, 
the CSL, and the 2018 Specifications, but must weigh protection 
against barriers to innovation to maintain its stance in the global 
AI race. In addition to easing the concerns of US citizens, 
implementing this new statute may make the thought of living 
alongside technology more palatable to wary consumers. This 
new future may encourage freely sharing certain types of data 
with corporations who promise to use and develop it into a 
societally advantageous program. 
Where once the thought of sharing data with companies or 
even the government seemed overwhelming, a clearly established 
and comprehensive data privacy statute may encourage 
participation on the global tech market and creative 
opportunities for individuals who had previously closed 
themselves off to such advancements. In enacting such a law, the 
United States could see tech investors emerge from industries not 
traditionally connected to technology, more individuals joining 
the tech workforce than before, and of course, fewer instances of 
corporate data misuse. All these aspects can contribute to the 
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